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Menezes: Law and Absolute Poverty

LAW AND ABSOLUTE POVERTY
JULIO MENEZES*t
INTRODUCTION

My principal objective in this article is to tentatively reexamine the perspectives from which one studies, improves or supports legal institutions in a materially impoverished society. This objective, by necessary implication, involves the assertion that existing approaches are inadequate. Making a credible case against
widely held schools of thought in a single article, however, is difficult, if not genuinely foolhardy. The problem is compounded by my
preference for assuming that the reader knows very little about
non-industrialized societies. Thus, in seeking to attain my objective,
necessity has led to invention. Two specific factual situations are
sketched in order to illustrate the operation of law in a nonindustrialized society. Simultaneously, they are taken to reflect an
intellectual approach. The validity of the rest of the article is,
therefore, dependent on whether in this particular context events
may be understood as representing jurisprudential positions.
The year 1980 marks another low point in global starvation and
the mass media have given the matter considerable attention.
Statistics, therefore, become redundant. Third World statistics are
generally unreliable, especially in regard to food supply. In addition
to the logistical problems of compiling data about subsistence,
political considerations tend to interfere with the process. At times
governments attempt to suppress information, and at other times
they exaggerate their problems.1 While wars and natural disasters
only make the crisis more acute, poverty and starvation are endemic
in the Third World' and take their toll during the interludes of
peace and normal harvests. The scale of the problem is large enough
to warrant and attract academic attention.
In 1975, the Dag Hammerskjold Foundation issued a special
report entitled What Now? Another Development.' In its own
*Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor. Member Law Society of
Upper Canada.
tI am indebted to Professor Jack Hiller and Professor Paul Brietzke for their
comments on a previous draft of this article.
1. J. SHEPHERD, THE POLITICS OF STARVATION (1975).
2. World Food Supply, 2 THIRD WORLD Q. No. 3, p. 551 (1980).
3. DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUES (1975) [hereinafter referred to as Another
Development]. The report did not claim to be original and makes substantial
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words, Another Development was "neither a manifesto nor an
academic exercise." It had elements of both. The report was, as the
title suggests, prompted by the pervasive frustration over the perceivable worsening problems of the Third World after decades of
debate and concern. It crystalized an academic concern over the adequacy of the intellectual theory applied in tackling those problems.
The essential conceptual framework is set out in Another Development as follows:
Development is a whole. Its ecological, cultural, social,
economic, institutional and political dimensions can only
be understood in their systematic interrelationships, and
action in its service must be integrated. Similarly, needs
cannot be dissociated from each other: the satisfaction of
each need is at one and the same time the condition and
the result of satisfaction of all others. Analysis may require that the parts of the whole be examined one by one,
but this should not obscure their essential unity or the
many inextricable bonds which bind them. Thus, the
elements of the following discussion make sense only
through and in their complementarity.
The discussion is structured first around three central
elements, the three pillars, so to speak, of another
development, which would be:
1. Geared to the satisfaction of needs, beginning with
the eradication of poverty.
2. Endogenous and self-reliant, that is, relying on the
strength of the societies which undertake it.
3. In harmony with the environment.4
The brevity of the statement and the diffuse audience to which it is
addressed, give it the semblance of a manifesto. The academic
challenge it sets out is, however, very considerable. Part of that
challenge falls upon lawyers.
Some legal academics and policymakers are still accused of seeing themselves as mere scribes who perform no policy-shaping role.'
Such individuals may exist, but I am unaware of them, so I shall not
dwell on this. Likewise, the necessity for a multi-disciplinary apacknowledgement to others. The approach has, however, become known as "Another
Development" or "Basic Needs Approach."
4. Id. at 28.
5. R. SEIDMAN, THE STATE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 18 (1978).
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proach to development and the need to recognize the interrelationship of elements of the social system appear to meet no
seriously articulated challenge. The focus on "law," then, is merely
for the purpose of examining the implications of Another Development for institutions and programs that are readily understood to
be legal.' It is not an analysis of positive law since I am concerned
more with the rationale, than with the rules.
Legal academics, very properly, when launching into discussion
of the theoretical underpinnings of a field, make explicit that they
do not purport to do so as philosophers. That caveat is particularly
appropriate in this instance for two reasons. Given my talents, an
attempt to "do philosophy" would be presumptuous. In addition,
there is the special focus of this article. The very expression "Third
World,"7 which suggests that geographically and ethnically diverse
nations fall into a single category, stems from the belief that they
share certain essential characteristics. Starvation, poverty, and a
variety of other social indicators are the principal, common features.
Another feature is history. The acephelous tribal societies that inspired social theorists may survive in parts of the Third World.
However, a colonial history is so dominant a feature of these nations
that they bear no greater resemblance to the ideal "state of nature"
than Rousseau's France. As independent nations, sovereign in a formal legal sense, their legal systems and political economies bear the
mark of their intermediate colonial past, more profoundly than that
of pre-existing cultures. As academics we must take the problem as
we find it.
. I intend for reasons of economy and personal preference to
simplify the problem by not taking into account the potential of
foreign aid or the so-called new international economic order. The
issues raised by an absence of political will-the refusal of key
political players to implement beneficial policies for reasons of personal greed, megalomania or temerity-are also not addressed. Both
international assistance and domestic leadership are very substantial concerns, and feature very prominently in Another Development. Setting aside the promise of foreign aid will be more readily
overlooked because a substantial body of literature exists question6. That is, formal law.
7. There are situations for which a more narrowly constructed category is
necessary. However if nothing else, the Third World or Group of 77 is an ideological
group, and the blanket denial that those nations lack anything in common is essentially
an opposing ideological position. My special focus on East Africa is simply an
outgrowth of greater familiarity with that region.
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ing the reality of that promise.! As a relevant example, one could
look to the Food for Peace Program of the United States. George
McGovern, as Chairman of the United States Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, said:
We dispense the surplus foods not on the basis of where
they are most needed, but on the basis of power, political
considerations of foreign affairs. In other words, we use
the food as ammunition. There's been a continuous struggle between the Department of State, which favors giving
food to our military allies, and the Department of
Agriculture, which prefers to use the food to market
future commercial markets for American business. Very
little of our Food for Peace has gone to Africa where tens
of thousands have perished from famine. But during the
last year nearly half of it went to Cambodia and South
Vietnam.'
There are many who take a more sanguine view than I do of
the imminence of a new international economic order, and who are
working very diligently to give it shape and substance. 10 It is still acceptable not to share in that optimism since it presents, most acutely,
the problems of legal responses to the elimination of starvation.
The opposite is true of the assumption made here that the requisite political will exists domestically. In making this assumption,
I do not intend to deny the existence of moral flaws among Third
World leaders or the enormous social consequences that result from
those flaws. Lack of political will is a very serious problem and
deserves serious attention. It does not follow, however, that by
ignoring a very serious facet of the problem, analysis of other issues
can be dismissed as bearing no relation to reality. There is still
room for "ideal" reasoning even in the least ideal of conditions. I attempt to reinforce that point by selecting examples of policies that
were advocated without any personal malevolence or opportunism
on the part of those suggesting them. I, of course, concede that by
simplifying the problem in this manner, one must forego any expectation of providing a directly viable blueprint for the future.
8. Even those who see it as being generally beneficial conclude that it increases inequality. See G. HOLTHAM AND A. HAZELWOOD, AID AND INEQUALITY IN KENYA
(1976).
9. Quoted in Another Development, supra note 3, at 30.
10. Declaration on the Establishment of New Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201,
5-VI U.N. GAOR Doc. A19556 (1974); BRANDT. NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, (1980).
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Apart from the significant distortion resulting from the
assumption of political will and the exclusion of external considerations, the discussion is grounded in the current conditions of the
Third World, particularly those of Kenya and Tanzania.
The Political Backdrop
Kenya and Tanzania are recognized as excellent societies for
comparative study because of their rough similarities in geography
and in their shared colonial history. Much of the research and writing about these two countries is focused on the impact of markedly
divergent economic and foreign policy postures on post-colonial
development. I believe that the investigation of these societies tends
to indicate a remarkable similarity in that development." Consequently, the insights to be gained from examining the official
statements of national goals and values are not very valuable. The
official ideologies seem to be studied and talked about mainly
because they exist.
The Kenyan contribution to development studies was labeled
"African Socialism."'" It made "mutual social responsibility" the cornerstone of social policy. The statement of national ideals emerged
in time to meet the challenge posed by a new political party-the
Kenya Peoples' Union (K.P.U.) formed by a radical splinter of the
ruling Kenya African National Union (K.A.N.U.). Since that opposition force has been removed 3 the manifesto is now reserved for
purely ceremonial purposes." That particularly cynical use of
ideology makes it relatively easy to resist the temptation to unravel
the tract for jurisprudential insights.
The inspiring sincerity of Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere
has attracted attention to the philosophy he espouses, namely,
5
Ujamaa."
The two key features of Ujamaa-that it is socialist and
African-were also stressed in the Kenyan platform. Both have an
obvious appeal to a population that has just rid itself of British colonialism. The combination allows for a broad range of goals and
methods, some of which will be justified by nationalistic, traditional
sentiments, and others, because they are egalitarian. Where neither
11.

Cf. I. SHIVJI, THE SILENT CLASS STRUGGLE (1976); C. LEYS, UNDERDEVELOP-

(1974).
12. Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 (Government Printer, Nairobi).

MENT IN KENYA

13.

C.

GERTZEL, THE POLITICS OF INDEPENDENT KENYA

(1969).

14. For the introductions to quinquennial development plans, see Development Plan 1974-1978 (Government Printer, Nairobi, 1974).
15. Swahili for "family-hood." J. NYERERE. FREEDOM AND SOCIALISM (1962).
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value is served, every office holder has an additional justification- pragmatism. To quote President Nyerere, mildly out of context, "I am pragmatic because I lead a government. You cannot lead
a government as a bishop or a professor. When you lead a government you have to achieve results, you have to do things."'6 Without
questioning President Nyerere's personal idealism, the degree to
which values can be elicited from the writings of practicing politicians is extremely limited.
The urban centers of Kenya and Tanzania show definite and
perceptible differences. The accepted level of opulence amid poverty
is much higher in Kenya. This difference can be attributed largely
to the difference between the ideology of the dominant personalities,
particularly the late Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere. The foreign
policy of the two countries is also discernibly different. While Kenya
has become very closely allied with the West, Tanzania steadfastly
strives to remain nonaligned. The similarities are at least as significant. Both have "dual" economies-a traditional sector of subsistence producers with a very limited connection to the monetary
economy and a modern sector dominated by the production of cash
crops for export. The modern sector of the economy in both countries has a mix of state and private enterprises." Private investment is both foreign and domestic.
One area in which their policies converge, to which I will
return later in this article, deals with civil liberties. Kenya had a
constitutionally entrenched charter of rights at the time of its independence." A year later the entrenchment was gone, 9 and by
1969, the ambit of rights was much more narrowly defined and the
permissible grounds for derogation expanded.' The "fundamental"
rights were made subject to the operation of the Preservation of
Public Security Act,"' which allows inter alia detention without trial,
censorship and forced labor. Tanzania examined the question of entrenching civil rights and decided against it.22 In 1962, a year after
16.
17.
18.

Third World Negotiating Strategy, 1 THIRD WORLD Q. No. 2,p. 21 (1979).
See note 11 supra.
[U.K.] Kenya Independence Act 1963, s.I (I),(3) (Order-in-Council). For a

detailed exposition of Civil Liberties in Kenya, see
AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN KENYA, Ch. IX.

GHAI

& McAUSLAN,

PUBLIC LAW

19. Constitution of Kenya Amendment Act 1964, No. 38 of 1964.
20. Constitution of Kenya Act 1969, No. 5 of 1969.
21. Id. at § 83.
22. Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a
Democratic One Party State (Government Printer, Dar-es-Salaam, 1965) [hereinafter
cited as Report of Presidential Commission).
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independence, it passed the Preventive Detention Act,"8 which
authorized arrest and detention without trial. On the positive side,
Tanzania established the office of a Permanent Commission of Enquiry" and made considerable efforts to give it status. In Kenya, the
convention of the ministerial duty to respond to questions in the National Assembly has continued, at least for individual complaint, if
not for the purpose of subjecting cabinet policy to criticism.
Even this brief listing of similarities and differences suggests
that it would be fruitful to sidestep official ideology and examine
particular legal institutions in the light of the specific justifications
given for their creation. An institution shaped by "experts" will
reflect their personal perspectives and adopt, in varying degrees,
the position of some theoretical movement. Subsequent implementation may distort the institution, but its design must incorporate a vision of the problem and of preferred solutions. That vision is suspect
if it reaches a point where it can only operate by accepting solutions
that deny the values that operated in the initial identification and
characterization of the problem.
WHY ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT?
International scholars concerned with law in Third World
societies have chosen to be identified by their perception not of the
problems but of the cures. The field has come to be known as "Law
and Development. 2 5 The past decade has produced evidence of an
acute personal disappointment with the fruits of such scholarship,
particularly among academics from the United States." Some of the
frustration appears to flow from that title. It apparently suggests to
some academics the possibility of providing unique insights into
legal historiography. Failing to reach a concensus on what constitutes "development," the participants or their critics are dissatisfied. Criticisms of that nature are valid when leveled against
academics who view the developing nations as an exotic laboratory
for the "scientific" study of law. Academics concerned primarily
23. The Preventive Detention Act, 1962, ch. 490.
24. Interim Constitution of Tanzania, Act. No. 43 of 1965, § 67. See J.
McAuslan and Y. Ghai, Constitutional Innovation and PoliticalStability in Tanzania, 4
J. of MOD. AFr.STUD., No. 4, 491 (1966).
25. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457
(1977).
26. Trubek and Galenter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement" Some Reflections
on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WiS. L.
REV. 1062.
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with contributing, as best they can, to the material advance of the
poor are less affected by such criticisms.
Another Development is the product of a much more global
frustration. Decades of research, foreign aid, development programs,
political meetings at national, international, and other levels had left
the Third World in a condition possibly worse than it was at the
time of the declaration of the first "Development Decade" fifteen
years before the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations.
Cherished dreams and the promise of decolonization had not
materialized. Crudely generalized, visions of the future fell somewhere along the continuum of views bounded by ultra capitalists at
one extreme and radical Marxists at the other.
The particular labels for the application of northern ideologies
to development studies are "modernization" and "underdevelopment." ' To maintain the link with legal schools of thought, I shall
use the familiar labels of liberal and socialist.' The ultra Western
position (more a useful caricature for academic abuse than identifiable individuals) allegedly sees colonialism as an altruistic and
paternal development of the colonized societies to the point where
they become self-governing. Liberals do not necessarily share that
view but firmly believe that post-colonial development requires the
ongoing sophistication of technology, laws, and legal institutions in
order to maximize efficiency and productivity. A corollary that requires the special attention of lawyers is to insure that the powers
of the state are not abused as against the individual. The models for
this form of development are Western.
Legal development in the liberal democratic tradition obviously
takes its lead from economics. The need to alter Western economic
ideology to take into account the problems of the Third World are
immediately apparent. Third World countries cannot replicate the
economic development of Western societies because conditions are
markedly different. Moreover, certain correlations that might exist
in industrial economics are often meaningless in a nonindustrialized
setting. In particular, there is little reason to assume that benefits
of aid or investment "trickle down." A close look at the effects of
27. Compare C. KINDLEBERGER & B. HERRICK, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1977)
FRANK, CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (1967) and W.
RODNEY, How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA (1972).

with

28. The generalized categories blur perceptible distinctions of subgroups
within each camp. Apart from the difficulty of fully acknowledging the various factions
and schisms within a brief article there is little need for it in order to demonstrate the
potential benefit of Another Development.
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economic growth indicates that it does not necessarily result in
benefits to the poor and, in fact, may result in a worsening of their
position. With a great and growing inequality of wealth and income,
growth in per capita gross national product does not represent
meaningful progress. Tables from an economic report on Kenya help
illustrate these concerns." Though there is no unanimity among
liberal economists that the "trickle down" theory of development is
29.
Trends in Income Distribution,1963-74
(a) The Distributionof Smallholders Income in Central Province 1963 and
1974.
Change
in per
Capita
Population
% Income
% Change Real In(By Income)
1963
1974
in Share
come %
POOREST
40
24.38
18.23
- 25.22
+ 4.3
MIDDLE
30
25.27
27.66
+ 9.46
+ 52.7
RICHEST
30
50.35
54.11
+ 7.47
+ 49.9
All
100.
100
0
+39.5
(b) The Distribution of SmaUholders Income in Nyanza, 1970 and 1974
Change
in per
Capita
Population
% Income
% Change Real In(by Income) 1970 1/
1974 2/
in share
come %
POOREST
40
28.85
18.44
- 36.09
- 19.1
MIDDLE
30
25.61
25.47
- 0.55
+ 27.4
RICHEST
30
46.54
56.09
+ 20.52
+ 54.4
All
100
100
0
+ 28.1
(c) The Distributionof Income in Nairobi, 1969 and 1974

POOREST
MIDDLE
RICHEST

Population
(By Income)
40
30
30
All

% Income
1969
1974
17.2
15.1
28.8
21.8
54.0
63.1
100
100

P. COLLIER

% Change
in Share
- 12.2
- 24.3
+ 16.9
0

Change
in per
Capita
Real Income %
+ 7.0
- 7.7
+ 42.5
+ 21.9

AND D. LAL, POVERTY AND GROWTH IN KENYA 7 (1980). The authors caution
that the statistics represent "snapshots" more than clear trends. Central and Hyanza
Provinces are both better than average agricultural lands but are very densely
populated.
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invalid, 30 for many economists the case against the theory is persuasive enough to have led them to search for alternatives, such as
Another Development.
Socialists integrate political and economic theory much more
fully than liberals do. A conscious concern with the power relationships inherent in economic activity make the possibility of a negative distributive impact entirely predictable. Those results are
causally connected to the mode of investment. The central challenge
of socialist development is to shape the economy so as to promote
the ideal of eliminating class stratification. For socialists, the search
for novel approaches has been prompted by the pattern that has
emerged in the drive towards the creation of nonexploitative
economic institutions.
Independence has been achieved by revolutionary struggle.
Those forces winning the battles could have continued the transformation of society into a just socialist system. Unfortunately, the
politicians and bureaucrats who were expected to be in the vanguard of such an ongoing struggle, appear to have coalesced into an
interest group that is in opposition to the workers and peasants. 1
Trends in the Distribution of
Smallholder Consumption, 1963-1974
% Population
(by household
Income)
POOREST
MIDDLE
RICHEST

40
30
30

Central Province
Nyanza
1963 1/ 1974 2/ 1970 3/ 1974 4/
32.2
25.8
32.2
26.2
24.7
28.4
30.7
29.7
43.1
45.8
37.1
44.1

Id. at 9.
Table 7:

POOREST
MIDDLE
RICHEST

Id. at 10.
30.
31.
(1973).

Landholding of Those Cultivating Land
on Smallholdings (% Land Owned)

% Population (by
Central Province
Land Size) 1961
1963
1974
40
23.9
26.3
18.3
30
30.9
29.7
27.9
30
45.2
44.0
53.8
All
100.0
100.0
100.0

Nyanza
1961
1974
15.6
12.9
29.5
28.0
54.9
59.1
100.0
100.0

Albert Fislow, 1978 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 231, 252.
See SHIVJA supra note 11. P. CHALIAND. REVOLUTION INTHE THIRD WORLD
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The preceding brief sketch of trends in the developing nations
seems to suggest that greater attention be focused on the rich and
the powerful. Another Development stresses what is viewed as contradictions on the one hand, between the industrialized nations and
the Third World, and on the other hand, between the privileged
within the Third World and the poorest segments of those
societies.' Nevertheless, without any embarrassment, the report
leaves it to the oppressed to discover their way out. There are two
explanations for the adoption of this posture in Another Development. First, the commitment to "self-reliance" requires that it be
so." Second, there is the belief-articulated in a later contribution
to the literature on Another Development entitled Reshaping the
InternationalOrder-which may be stated as follows:
In the final analysis, our world is ruled by ideas-rational
and ethical-and not by vested interests. The "power of
the idea," the particular weapon of scientists, moralists
and concerned citizens, must prove of decisive importance
in constructing a fairer and more peaceful world and the
search for relevant new ideas must be intensified so as to
support it.H

This article is based, of course, on the belief that rational and
ethical ideas are important, notwithstanding that the claim that they
rule the world is merely a colorful flourish. Bureaucracies require, in
Weber's terms, legitimating rationalizations. Stripped of their protective myths, they are made vulnerable. Unfortunately, this is less
true of the ruling elites in the Third World than it is of multinational bodies whose proclaimed raison d'etre is the alleviation of
global poverty. Governments can continue to operate through other
forms of power besides authority. There is vast room for manipulation and, should all else fail, for naked coercion.
The appeal of Another Development is twofold. It sets more
specific targets than does a general commitment to development.
Another Development also seeks to protect against certain ethical
blind spots revealed by the academic responses to the problems of
development. Notwithstanding the subjectivity of values, academics
have and use values for ideological purposes to the same extent that
32. Another Development, supra note 3, at 38.
33. Id. at 36.

34.

RESHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

35.

Id. at 107.
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bureaucrats do.M Under such circumstances, the ideals may not be
considered either cynical or self-serving, and those of both the
bureaucrats and the academics are at least worthy of attention.
The reason the debate concerning goals and values need not
regress to assertion and counter-assertion is that lawyers concerned
with development share considerable common ground. There is the
common commitment to the elimination of poverty in the Third
World. There is also an understanding that the ideology of any particular academic discipline does not adequately cover the entire
field. Finally, but more tenuously, there is the assumption that
policies are more efficiently and effectively co-ordinated, defined,
and operationalized through legal formulation. 7 This last proposition
is tentative not because the myth of the lawyer as mere scribe has
any great academic support, but because a serious case can, of
course, be made for extra-legal development.'
Even addressing an audience homogenized by the assumptions
listed above, the underpinnings of the method that uses particular
events to exemplify both the need for a new perspective and the
benefits of the perspective offered by Another Development, will be
controversial at best. The focus on civil liberties and land reform is
eminently defensible as they are central to the field of legal development. The pragmatic response of two developing nations to questions of civil liberty or property may be similar despite widely
divergent official ideologies. The same is not true of the academic input that goes into the shaping and analysis of policies. The distortion of programs by corrupt, fraudulent or inept implementation is
not to be laid at the feet of the expert whose altruism and integrity
I assume to be at least as high as my own. It is also important to
stress that the argument being made is that both socialist and
liberal perspectives that do not incorporate the essential features of
Another Development are deficient by the very criteria of socialism
and liberalism respectively.
A socialist example may be taken from Robert Martin's book
PersonalFreedom and the Law in Tanzania.9 It is obvious from the
very inclusion of the following episode in the book and from the
author's introductory sentence that it typifies an issue of significant
concern to socialist scholars.
36.
37.
coming).
38.
39.

C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION (1959).

P. BRIETZKE, LAW, DEVELOPMENT AND THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION (forthAbel, Law Books and Books About Law, 26 STANFORD L. REV. 175 (1973).
R. MARTIN, PERSONAL FREEDOM AND THE LAW IN TANZANIA (1974).
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Consider the following example of the difficulties involved
in appreciating the true nature of a particular contradiction: on 16th June, 1969, approximately 150 workers at a
shirt factory in Dar-es-Salaam walked out of work and
staged a demonstration to protest against the methods being used by the production manager at the factory. The
police field-force unit was called to the scene and arrived
at the factory wearing steel helmets and armed with semiautomatic rifles with bayonets fixed. They immediately arrested the workers and herded them into trucks. The
workers were then carried to the Central Police Station in
Dar-es-Salaam .

.

. where they were marched with hands

over head into custody. The arrests were made on the
grounds that workers had engaged in conduct which,
under Tanzania's Labour Laws, amounted to an illegal
strike. The Second Vice-President, Mr. Kawawa, then intervened. He ordered the release of the arrested
"strikers" and called a meeting to be held the next day at
the shirt factory. At this meeting he ordered the dismissal
of the production manager and warned the firm not to
mistreat the workers. He also warned the firm not to take
advantage of laws designed to inhibit strikes and seemed
to disavow the action of the police. The Nationalist, the official organ of Tanu, carried an editorial on 18th June
which was severely critical of the police action and
pointed out that in this case the enemies of the people
were not the "striking workers," as the actions of the
police seemed to indicate but the capitalist owners of the
factory. 0
The labor laws under which the arrests were made clearly deal with
the relationship between individuals and the modes of production.
4
For our purposes the harangues of Mr. Kawawa ' and the editor and
the ad-hoc solution to the problem are of no great moment. The imputation of fault to the police and not to the policy-makers of the
laws is important. At the time, most employers were Asian immigrants and most workers were indigenous Africans. The sure-fire
methods of deciding who the "good guys" are by race or national
origin are precluded by socialist theory, which explains racial tension in Tanzania, and elsewhere, as a product of the economic struc40. Id. at 32.
41. Subsequently found to be an "enemy of the people."

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 [1981], Art. 6
356

VALPARAISO

UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

ture. The event is also notable precisely because straight-forward
class analysis does not help resolve the question of when the law
should be enforced. Individuals are governed by the labor laws according to their class, ie., as workers or employers. The solution
socialists must resort to is found in the metaphysical maze of "true"
and "false" consciousness.
For a liberal example consider the following from Reshaping
the InternationalOrder. "[L]and taxes, where land is privately owned,
can be administered without excessive difficulty. They carry the additional advantage that they can be used as a powerful incentive to
make the best use of the land available.""' It should be borne in
mind that Reshaping the InternationalOrder was responding to the
problem of the material conditions in the Third World. The connection between the recommendation quoted above and events in the
Third World will be elaborated below. For the moment, follow the
policy through this hypothetical scenerio. To implement the policy, a
government implements a program of registering title. For reasons
of benevolence it restricts the level of the land taxes to an amount
that merely covers the cost of initial registration. A drought occurs,
farmer A is unable to pay the tax or to pay for food. He sells his
land to the adjacent farmer B, who is engaged in producing a noncomestible crop such as coffee or bananas for export. Eventually
unable to survive through crime or charity, farmer A dies. Productivity has increased but food production has not. However, the supply/demand situation has changed. There is at least one less mouth
to feed."
The ethical problems that arise from either of the legal policies
set out above emerge from the level of deprivation prevailing in the
Third World. In 1973, speaking to the Governors of the World Bank
in Nairobi, Robert McNamara described a condition of absolute
poverty as:
a condition of life so limited as to prevent the realization
of the potential of the genes with which one is born; a condition of life so degrading as to insult human dignity-yet
a condition of life so common as to be the lot of some
40%-800,000,000 individuals-of the people of the
developing countries."
42.

RESHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER,

supra note 34, at 85.

43. For convenience, constant reference to dependents is avoided but their
rights are equally a matter of concern.
44. 1973 Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors 16, I.B.R.D. (World Bank).
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The concept of absolute poverty, which is not relative to
average incomes or other variable standards, is a valuable tool in
researching the Third World. The absolute poverty line determined
by minimum daily nutritional needs permits economists to make
comparable observations between subsistence farmers and the urban unemployed' 5 a more meaningful figure than a comparison of
earnings. In law, the notion of absolute poverty has a somewhat different potential use. The institution that creates and protects relationships to resources must contend with the morality of the rights
created within the social context in which the institution operates.
While medicine and nutrition have ideological components and
margins of uncertainty, health experts would agree that a stageis
reached at which starvation is the cause of death. In pursuit of
grand dreams of "human dignity," "equality," and "self-sustaining
growth," the point may have been lost that starvation is the
equivalent of capital punishment. The analogy obviously is laden
with emotional connotation. It is therefore suspect. But kwashiorkor,
pellegra, and anorexia are less emotionally laden than "class," "efficiency," or for that matter "development." In many jurisdictions it
is a criminal offense to deprive individuals, in certain relationships
to the accused, of the necessities of life, if that deprivation results in
the loss of life or impairment of health." Difficult as it may be to obtain convictions for such crimes, an equivalence between deprivation, on the one hand, and direct violence, on the other, is, nevertheless, accepted. In the case of legal intervention in the lives of the
absolute poor, it must follow that the morality of causing further
deprivation is as relevant as any necessary justification for the use
of force. Accelerating death may be as culpable as causing it.
The concept of absolute poverty makes the benefit of Another
Development obvious in that it focuses on the primary basis for action. Liberals and Socialists are distinguished from each other by
their explanations as to the causes of poverty. They are united by
their approach that suggests that one can eliminate the cause and
that a cure has been found. Another Development demands that consideration be given to the impact of the remedies on the poor.' 7 At
the very minimum there must be two stages of analysis. The first is
a subsistence analysis that contends with a moral right to survival.
Only when the law protects that basic minimum right can one proceed to pursue the grander goals that dominate ethical debates in
45.
46.
47.

See P. COLLIER AND D. LAL, note 29 supra.
See, e.g., CAN. REV. STAT., ch. 34, § 197 (1970) (Canadian Criminal Code).
See Another Development, note 3 supra.
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the affluent world. A brief return to the earlier illustrations on civil
liberties and land reform will demonstrate the benefit of keeping absolute poverty in mind.
SUBSISTENCE ANALYSIS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

The essence of the arguments against legal protection of civil
rights in the Third World is, strangely enough, poverty and development. The following are a representative selection. A fairly brief
strike (assumed to be an incident of the right of association) of
railway employees in India could lead to the death of millions.' a
Clashes between the judiciary and the executive "is a luxury" in a
newly emergent nation." Effective (as opposed to symbolic) protection of civil liberties is primarily dependent on a political and
cultural base that requires a sophisticated citizenry.' In any event,
the poor cannot afford the court system and would therefore obtain
no protection." Even where statements are addressed to domestic
policy-making bodies, they appear to be primarily directed at actual
or perceived criticism from the Western world. In addition to the
arguments against protections similar to those recognized by industrialized liberal democracies, an even more fervent debate about
civil rights has been fed by the entry of the Third World nations into international organizations. As temporary allies of the Warsaw
bloc they have demanded the recognition of new rights. Consequently, a whole new industry of labeling and name-calling has been
born." One can now stand behind rights that are positive versus
negative; economic, social and cultural versus civil and political; communal or socialist versus individualistic and bourgeois. All of this
may mean a great deal in the world of international law, but from
the perspective of domestic subsistence rights, the new vocabulary
is utterly sterile. Where the government cannot afford to institute a
welfare system the positive "rights" to food and other necessities
are meaningless. The best that one can hope for is that the right
will operate negatively (as in the United States Bill of Rights) to
preclude the government from implementing policies that would
deprive the individual of the means of subsistence." The right to
48.

Nehru, Western Democracy and The Third World, 2

THIRD WORLD

Q. 53

(1979).
49. Report of the PresidentialCommission, note 22 supra.
50. Id. at 203.
51. Id. at 86.
52. See Preambles to International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 21
U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A6316 (1967).
53. Oscar Schacter, 1978 PRoc. OF THE Am. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. 231.
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form a trade union or co-operative may be primarily economic but it
is also political; conversely, the political choice between
Tweedledum and Tweedledee exercised by voters in liberal nations
is as much an act of economic yearning as it is an unpopularity contest. I need hardly add that I am incapable of taking seriously the
potential of a state to feed, employ or educate the nation without
feeding, employing or educating individuals!
Returning to the problem of the strike at the shirt factory, it appears to be a matter of not ascribing blame where it is properly due.
Third World economies are essentially dualistic with a modern
monetary sector, which is largely urban, and a traditional nonmonetary sector, which is largely rural. A member of a trade union, however rigorously controlled an association it is, is substantially better
off than the peasantry, let alone the unemployed landless. Any major investment, even if it is totally privately owned, involves public
capital investment in the economic infrastructure and, more likely
than not, a protected market, investment incentives and obligations
to the international monetary system. Under these circumstances,
the argument for individual autonomy of workers is hard to make,
even where the product is not an absolute essential. Where the product or service is an essential, curbing the right to collective work
stoppage is much easier to make. It is nevertheless poor legislation
that makes any form of strike illegal and then presumes to lay the
blame on the enforcers. The question of whether workers should be
permitted to strike in a society where a segment of the society
starves to death, leads to better answers. Subsistence analysis
would not necessarily give the workers the right to strike for pay
(assuming wages are above the subsistence level). It would, however, provide the very basis for the right to strike against hazardous conditions, physical abuse, or the obligation to recoup a proper
share of any surplus for the public as against rapacious or dishonest
management.
The same can be said for almost the entire range of civil or
economic rights, including the most controversial of all rights-the
right to land. Northern ideologies give no easily discernible answers
to what the nature of this right should be in the Third World. Marx
would not provide the rationale for abolishing individual rights of
the peasant farmer and the United States Bill of Rights would not
require the right to property override the government power to
take from the haves to give to the have nots." What Another
54. Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Assoc., 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir.), cerL denied,
329 U.S. 772 (1946).
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Development seems to me to suggest is that one does not examine
questions of civil liberties from the standpoint of what it means or
how it is achieved in the industrialized world. Ignoring the industrial world and concentrating on acute poverty, the arguments
against civil liberties mentioned earlier become virtually irrelevant.
Judicial safeguards are not a luxury when the stake is the individual's best and only chance at survival. A supportive culture
that recognizes limits to the power of government is not going to
emerge any faster within a particular society, if no mechanism is
provided for challenge. Rights do not have to be protected as absolutes that do not allow for distinctions to be made between very
rich and very poor.
LAND REFORM
There is an element of unfairness in my selecting from Reshaping the InternationalOrder the proposal for land taxes. It is an incidental paragraph in a report that attempts to deal with almost
everything from the ocean floor to outer space. The source of the
proposal was important in that it would take an extraordinary conspiracy theory to link the recommendation with the self-interest of
the authors. The real source of inspiration for the selection of a
policy aimed at promoting land transfer as a means towards
development was land reform -in Kenya. I think the policy implemented in Kenya is a perfect example of the liberal modernization perspective. It was originated by colonial experts and may,
therefore, be suspect, but it provides an excellent illustration of the
need for Another Development.
In brief,55 the British, after some initial hesitation, assumed
both sovereignty over Kenya and ownership of land." Pre-colonial
rights were relegated to "tenancies at will."57 Within defined tribal
reserves, customary entitlement to property and succession was
maintained." In the early 1950s, a dramatic change in policy, coincidental with the Mau Mau uprising, was formulated. That colonial
policy has been adopted and accelerated since independence. 9 The
55.

For a fuller account of the Kenyan reforms, see M.

REFORM IN THE KIKUYU COUNTRY (1967).
56. GHAI AND McAUSLAN, supra note

SORRENSON,

LAND

18, at 25-30.
57. Gathomo v. Murito, 9 E. Afr. L. Rep. 102.
58. The territorial limits of African versus European lands was kept flexible
for the benefit of the latter until the late 1930's. Crown Lands (Amendment) Ordinance
No. 27 of 1938; Native Lands Trust Ordinance, No. 28 of 1938.
59. Report of the Mission on Land Consolidation and Registration in Kenya
1965-1966 (Government Printer, Nairobi, 1966) [hereinafter referred to as the
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basis of the policy was the Swynnerton Plan.' There are three elements to the plan that have to be distinguished because one-land
consolidation- has been sparingly applied since independence."1 The
principal element is the registration of individual title under the
Registered Land Act. 2 An essential prerequisite is adjudication of
rights existing at the time of initial registration. Land consolidation
was initially combined with the process of adjudication in order to
create efficiencies by giving the registrant one parcel of land approximately equal to several widely dispersed units. This aspect of
the program was found to be an unnecessary and politically antagonizing adjunct of registration and has been downgraded. The
third element was to extend credit and advice on terracing and
other better farming practices to increase productivity.
As Snynnerton saw it, through the individualization of land
holding and free alienability, "the able, energetic or rich Africans
[would] be able to acquire more land and bad or poor farmers less,
creating a landed and landless class. This is a normal step in the
evolution of a country."" The desired result would emerge faster
and more directly from the Swynnerton Plan than in the hypothetical situation described earlier, and the costs of the policy were
understood and spelled out more explicitly than they were in the
recommendation on land taxes in Reshaping the International
Order. Apart from fraud and other malfunctions in the process, the
emergence of a landless class was inherent to the program for reform for two reasons. First, there was no complete correlation between the property rights recognized under the statutory scheme
and rights under customary law. The traditional rights ceased to apply after registration. The individual with the most substantial claim
under customary law became the "absolute owner."6 Customary
rights not recognized by the statutory regime were extinguished
with no compensation. Second, all the proponents of freely alienable
title were well aware of the adage "[tihe quickest way to deprive a
peasant of his land is to give him title to it." This had, after all, been
the basis of colonial paternalism. 5
Lawrence Report]; Development Plan 1974-1978, 216-20. (Government Printer, Nairobi,
1974).
60. Swnynnerton, A Plan to Intensify the Development of African
Agriculture in Kenya (Government Printer, Nairobi, 1955).
61. Lawrence Report, supra note 59, at ch. X.
62. Laws of Kenya, Registered Land Act, ch. 300, § 3 (No. 25 of 1963).
63. Swnynnerton, supra note 60, at 60.
64. Note 62 supra.
65. Lawrence Report, supra note 59, at ch. XVI. Simpson, Land Problems in
Papua New Guinea, 40 NEw GUINEA RESEARCH BULL. 1 (1971).
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In 1965 a joint British-Kenyan Mission was appointed to
evaluate land consolidation and registration." Their report confirmed that the anticipated loss of access to land had occurred both
as a result of the process of registration"7 and through alienation by
the registrants." The Commissioners were critical of aspects of the
program, such as the political hype promoting registration."' They
refused to see all gains in productivity as resulting from tenure
reform. They nevertheless came out strongly in favor of the continued march toward freely alienable individual title. The program
of land registration has been continued and accelerated.
It is difficult to identify in all of this policy-making those concerns that are "legal," because the design of legal institutions is a
major feature of that which is "economic" or "agricultural." But at
one point in the formulation of land tenure policy, subsistence
analysis slipped in and triumphed! Clearly, if one had the power to
increase productivity by wiping out subordinate vested interests at
the stroke of a pen, why not go a step further and eliminate proprietary interests where the size of the parcel of land or the skills of
the farmer made the interest economically insignificant? This was
advocated and explicitly rejected in Kenya.
The essence of the system which we propose is that
ownership is established by proving long occupation to
the satisfaction of the traditional land authorities; size of
holdings and standards of farming are irrelevant factors
which in no way affect the right to be entered in the
Record of Existing Rights. Neglected fragments are
recorded equally with well-planned farms. The process of
adjudication must be applied equally to all and it would be
unjust to allow recognition of one owner, a good farmer,
and refuse another because, for instance, his holding is too
small. It might well be the only land he owned.7'
What happens to the people displaced by tenure reform? In
some instances the formal program may not change anything, and
the actual working of the land continues as it did before registration.7 Some landless are re-settled on land purchased from colonial
66. Lawrence Report, note 59 supra.
67. Id. at 19.
68. Id. at 24, para. 87.
69. Id. at ch. VII.
70. Report of the Working Party on African Land Tenure 1957-1958, 19
(Government Printer, Nairobi, 1958) (emphasis added).
71. The reforms did not originally extend to changing the applicable
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settlers or on previously uncultivated government land."2 Others
migrate in search of a livelihood. They must either move to the urban centers in search of work or find unoccupied land to cultivate,
possibly marginal agricultural land previously occupied by and exclusively reserved for nomadic pastoralists. This in turn changes the
focus of attention from land reform to freedom of movement. Both
the legal powers and police actions aimed against urban slum
dwellers, mainly rural immigrants, have been expanded since independence.7" Conversely, the freedom of movement to the drier
range lands has been increased.7 ' This is in dramatic contrast to the
5
general trend on entrenched rights.1
The legal balance sheet of the Kenyan reform shows some individuals have had their property rights enhanced through legislation or grants of public land. The public at large has paid for some
of the costs through paying for adjudication and registration and for
a substantial portion of the costs of the settlement schemes. The
other contributors are those whose proprietary interests under
customary law were extinguished without compensation, and the
pastoralists who have had the territory over which they moved (and
grazed) diminished by the increased freedom of movement given to
outsiders.7 6 The victims of the policy will also eventually rank among
the victims of malnutrition.
BASIC HUMAN NEEDS AND SELF-RELIANCE
Subsistence analysis is obviously relevant to a workers' strike
or land tenure reform. It is also relevant to other Third World legal
issues in which the connection between the particular legal institution and the means of subsistence is less direct. However, in order
to proceed with the application of Another Development to law in
the Third World, one must first focus on the report itself. Another
Development merely provides a framework to which the substance
of each individual's role in development must be added. It leaves
customary law of succession.-As a result, and also due to sheer necessity, informal subdivision of land occurs.
72. Development Plan 1974-1978, supra note 14, at 225-30.
73. Freedom of movement of Africans was very severely restricted during
the colonial days. The right to freedom of movement was established by the Independence Constitution. A new Vagrancy Act (Laws of Kenya, No. 61 of 1969) was
enacted after independence. It is the center piece of psychological and physical campaigns against the urban poor.
74. Without Constitutional amendment.
75. Note 18 supra.
76. COLLIER AND LAL, supra note 29, at 58.
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hard questions and internal conflicts for each academic discipline.
For those who seek to operate solely through domestic legal policy,
resolution of questions and conflicts must be arrived at without
recourse to the probability of greatly increased international
assistance.
Of the "three pillars" of Another Development-satisfaction of
basic needs, through endogenous and self-reliant methods, that are
in harmony with the environment-the last is not especially difficult. The environmental constraint has been defined so very narrowly as to be virtually eliminated. The less extreme consequences
of human impact on nature, such as a potable water supply, are
treated as basic necessities for a safe "habitat." The call for endogenous structures is initially ignored for reasons stated later. For
the moment, consider the goals of satisfying basic needs through
self-reliance.
Certain normative duties have been suggested to correlate to
subsistence rights. They are the duties "not to eliminate a person's
only available means of subsistence, that is, a duty to forebear from
depriving; to protect people from deprivation by others of their only
means of subsistence; and to provide subsistence for those unable to
'
The suggestion was made in an internaprovide for their own."77
tional context. Since the obligations would apply at all levels, ie., to
individuals, multinationals, and domestic and foreign governments,
their fulfillment through global resources is theoretically possible in
the near future. Tragically, without external aid the fulfillment of
these obligations through internal redistribution is not even theoretically possible for about sixty of the Third World countries.
All resources are extremely scarce. So even if there were no
clash between different needs, such as the growing and providing of
food, on the one hand, and an unpolluted water supply, on the other,
vital policy choices have to be made. As a consequence, a basic
human-needs approach to development presents enormous
challenges to economists. It not only calls into question the efficiency of market allocation but thrusts at the foundations of certain
disciplines, especially the dependence on exchange value. I am
struck by the extreme diffidence with which researchers add to the
productivity figures of a farm a figure representing the farm produce consumed by the owner."8 It is as if they fear an audit for
fraudulent accounting where the monetary estimate has not had the
77.
78.

Cheryl Cristensen, 1978 PROC. AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. 235.
Economic Survey No. 27 (Government Printer, Nairobi).
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benediction of an arms-length transaction. Possibly because of the
very severity of the limitations of the discipline, some economists,
when transposing it to a Third World context, have sought to
broaden its capabilities. 9 For most lawyers, by contrast, the idea
that non-market allocations may be necessary and desirable is not
particularly radical, and consequently, not as thought provoking.
"Lawyers concerned with economics"" may be in a better position to do more than make ad hoc comments about reform. A par1
ticularly useful exposition is found in the book Tragic Choices."
Its
central focus on the allocation of very vital and very scarce resources, particularly as they relate to situations that bring the value
of the prolongation of life into conflict with some other value, make
the work extremely relevant to Another Development. It is,
however, only tangentially so, because it is not just concerned with
scarcity per se but also with a particularly defined notion of "tragic
choice" that relates, for instance, to the mode of selection of land
ownership where starvation is rampant. 2
An engineer might conceptualize basic needs and self-reliance
as being complimentary. The machine must serve the basic needs of
the owner who ought to be able to afford and operate it-the foundations of "appropriate technology." However, in designing the
social system, this conceptualization is inadequate. There is a conflict present here that is commonplace to law. At the one extreme,
there are humane prisons where material needs are provided, but
personal autonomy is curbed and manipulated so as to be virtually
extinguished. At the other extreme, there is a totally laissez faire
system where individual autonomy is uninhibited except to prevent
physical injury to others, and only the strongest and fittest survive.
Very simply, if providing basic human needs is the only value, all intervention (perhaps excepting execution) would be permissible. Selfreliance as a primary and exclusive goal, however, would justify virtually no intervention. Through such a conflict as this, absolute
poverty highlights the point of convergence and of departure between Third World problems and the main concerns of Northern
jurisprudence.
79. Ahluwalia, Carter, and Chenery, Growth and Poverty in Developing Nations, 6 J. oF DEV. ECON. 299 (1979).
80. Calebresi and Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). The framework outlined
in the article links various private law perspectives but also law and allocations by
market or non-market institutions.
81. G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
82. Id. at 127.
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Without the capacity to realistically legislate freedom from
want, one is reduced to subsistence analysis. Under such an analysis,
the rights become negative and minimal. The moral basis for the
rights is the right not to be marginalized, directly or overtly, by the
erection of legal institutions other than those which guarantee to all
a borderline existence. In conditions of want, further marginalization
entails accelerated death. To legitimate an order that does not
guarantee the minimal right against marginalization is to argue that
potential victims acquiesce in their own death'-an argument that
cannot be made without resort to metaphysical eschatology.
Subsistence analysis would not preclude an economic transformation whose purpose is to increase productivity and whose aim is
much higher than meager existence. However, the onus is on the
reformers to achieve their objectives without sacrificing the lives of
others. Since the right against marginalization is self-supporting and
not founded on an assertion of any universal value, such as freedom
or equality, it would, unfortunately, be compatible with a system
that is neither democratic nor egalitarian. A Scandinavian foundation, such as the Dag Hammerskjold Foundation, and most
academics would find that conclusion distasteful. Moreover, there
are real dangers connected with issuing an altruistic manifesto in
favor of material values without asserting a strong commitment to
the abstract values clustered around "self-reliance" - freedom,
human dignity, and pluralism to name a few. Third World nations
present an ironical dual attitude towards the direct use of force and
manipulative violence. On the one hand, there is considerable zeal
by government officials for the protection of their status-often
through crude and brutal forms of coercion. On the other hand, most
of the nations are "soft-states," deficient in legislation, with lax enforcement of laws that do exist and with low levels of obedience to
those laws." However, a discussion of the role of coercion must, at
the very least, be tolerated within the secluded confines of an
academic journal.
The assertion of a right to subsist provides a moral argument
against coercion for certain purposes, but not against use of force
per se. The use of laws, backed by effective capacity for enforcement, to increase production, with the resulting products then being
83. There is the potential for a counter-argument based on the justification
used in supporting the drafting of soldiers in a moral war. The analogy is profitable
but would be imperfect.

84.

GUNNAR MYRDAL, ASIAN DRAMA:

(1968).
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distributed widely enough to ensure that every one has more, does
not violate a right to survival. Conversely, in order to safeguard
that minimal right, the use of force may be necessary and is morally
justifiable. Circumstances may require coercion of the poor as well
as the rich, in situations such as the encroachment by
agriculturalists on pastoral nomads.
The foundations of liberal arguments in favor of self-reliance,
entirely independent of the right to survival, tend to collapse on
themselves under conditions where absolute poverty is coupled with
enormous inequality of wealth, income and power. It is only the lack
of empirical research and writing in conjunction with whatever
abstract theoretical speculation is already at hand, that has led legal
academics who would not seriously argue in favor of laissez faire to
posit voluntariness and self-reliance as high level ideals.
Self-reliance, in a Third World context, becomes a secondary
value. Satisfaction of basic human needs is the primary goal. In the
course of making specific policy decisions promoting and safeguarding subsistence rights, choices between voluntariness and coercion,
incentives and compulsion may be available. 5 Favoring self-reliant
methods at that level of decision-making is compatible with subsistence analysis. Asserting a goal of self-reliance to veto programs
aimed at the goal of satisfaction of basic human needs, is not.
Even as a secondary value, however, the anti-coercive goal has
moral implications. The theoretical justification for the use of force
is confined to the limits dictated by subsistence rights. It follows
that anyone asserting technical expertise in designing or advocating
appropriate institutions must exercise prudence commensurate with
their claimed expertise. Obviously, it is morally culpable, on the one
hand, to exercise professional power, and on the other, when faced
with the abuse of the system, to plead the ingeniousness of the
abusers. The context may justify and even compel taking calculated
risks, but nothing can justify advocating monopolized coercion with
a naive disregard for realistically foreseeable distortion and exploitation of the system by those who are expected to make it work.
Building in effective safeguards into legal institutions is an integral
part of the task of design and advocacy.
ENDOGENOUS DEVELOPMENT

calls

Self-reliance aside, the second pillar of Another Development
for "[e]ndogenous [development], that is, relying on the
85.

SEIDMAN,

supra note 5, at 52.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 [1981], Art. 6
368

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

strength of societies undertaking it." The statement appears so trite
that perhaps one ought to demonstrate that it is worthy of attention
before subjecting it to criticism. If one focuses primarily on
economic programs (possibly the pre-eminent discipline among the
authors of the report), it is fairly easy to demonstrate that development patterns and institutions in the Third World cannot be modeled
on the industrialized world. Lawyers, with their broad range of concerns, from constitutional structures to domestic relations, would be
able to provide a list even longer than that which economists could
provide of illustrations of ill-fated and pernicious legal transplants.
Some instances of ill-considered legal importation are innocuous but
amusing, such as Professor Seidman's example of the prohibition
against being about after dark with a "black face"-legislation introduced to colonial Africa from and by Britain." A less entertaining
and current illustration is taken from Kenyan legislation. It helps incidently to emphasize that well-meaning experts can have a negative
impact on development without any assistance from malevolent
politicians.
In 1969 (the sixth year of independence), Kenya passed a set of
regulations governing building standards. 7 The Building Code defined a dwelling "as a part of a building lawfully used or constructed, adapted or designed to be used as a residence for one family." The code is a highly technical document, and it is therefore
improbable that any high level political figure ever read it. The best
explanation of the definition and the other bylaws aimed at restricting occupance to a nuclear family is that it was a copy of English
legislation. Western building technology carried with it its own baggage. In every country in the Third World, conditions of habitation
for the vast majority of the population fall far below the limits permissible under building codes."9 However, if compliance with the
standards were strictly enforced, health and comfort would be considerably lessened for those unable to pay the higher prices required for maintaining the unrealistic standards. The legislation was
certainly not a deliberate attempt to transform the traditional family, which is extended and polygamous, into the comparatively aberrational, nuclear family. The bylaw as it stands, and as occasionally
86. Id. at 34.
87. The Local Government (Adoptive By-Laws) Building Order 1968. Legal
Notice 15 of 1968.
88. By-Law 1.
89. C. ROSSER, URBANIZATION IN TROPICAL AFRICA (1972); D. DWYER, PEOPLE
AND HOUSING IN THE THIRD WORLD (1975).
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enforced," provides little health or safety advantages to the poor,
while increasing the numbers of those unable to afford adequate
housing.
While examples of counter-productive or ineffective legal intrusion are plentiful, the second pillar of Another Development has
much too obvious an inspirational source. Bad colonialism versus virtuous tradition was the first target of law and development. The
early writing on law and development is replete with situations
where social institutions, some of them pernicious, are defended on
the grounds that they are indigenous. It hardly matters. Victims of
profound racism can hardly be expected not to react to it. The return to the past is one such response. "The past having become a
constellation of values, becomes identified with the Truth. The sense
of past is rediscovered. The worship of ancestors resumes."9
A shift in focus from decolonization to current and future problems is an all too obvious necessity. With that perspective endogenous institutions may be good or bad in subsistence terms.
Starvation does not hit all within the society equally. The main victims are not merely a matter of natural selection. Social structures
have considerable impact on who pays the price. Some of those
structures are indigenous." To say that one should preserve what is
good in a society and add to it what is good in other societies is not
saying very much at all. As an argument for non-intervention or,
worse yet, for fossilizing traditional hierarchies of communal and
domestic exploitation, it conflicts with the satisfaction of basic
human needs.
CONCLUSION

The distance between the industrial and non-industrial worlds
is very great. The gap between the victims of starvation and poverty
and academics may be just as wide. If that gap were merely a matter of the failure of the absolute poor to fully appreciate liberty or
to recognize the conspiracies of imperialists, academic research and
writing aimed at developing that consciousness might well be a
meaningful response. It is hard to develop any intellectual certainty
90. Enforcement is harshest and consistent against squatters who have as a
result invented portable homes of bamboo and plastic sheeting. The homes are
dismantled before police raids and set up again after they depart. The press labeled
these structures "igloos." East African Standard, 29 April 1974, at 5.
91.
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92. LAW AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN (U.N. Centre for Social Development and
Humanitarian Affairs 1977).
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that such a response is anything but absurd. With starving individuals in mind, it appears to make much more sense to alter the
perspective of those looking on.
In dealing with issues of law under conditions of absolute
poverty, it may well be that foreign aid donors and domestic politicians have the most to do. Yet, even with goodwill from those
groups, they alone are not sufficient to solve the problems represented by millions of impoverished people. An entire social system
cannot be the gift of benevolent donors or perspicacious politicians.
In some measure policy scientists and lawyers must participate.
The lowering of one's horizons from all of the noblest goals of
humanity to mere subsistence is hard to accept. One can be reconciled to such acceptance by the absence of viable alternatives. I
must admit to much greater reluctance in arguing for greater intervention in people's lives and for the use of force. A much closer
look is required at circumstances which call for coercive measure
and how its exercise has to be controlled. Subsistence analysis must
at the same time be rigorously applied in all areas of substantive
and procedural law. After making such application, we would know
better whether or not the disquieting aspects of pursuing the goal of
satisfaction of basic human needs are really fears about the abuse of
the legal system. The fears may camouflage an unrealistic optimism
and a refusal to accept that something as negative and uninspiring
as survival should be a guiding value in shaping a legal system.
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